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Re Family First New Zealand1 has been a much anticipated case because it is the first case, as far 
as the author is aware, to have considered, and applied the principles set out so eloquently in the 
2014 Supreme Court case of Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc.2 The Greenpeace decision was 
fundamental with regard to charity law in New Zealand because the majority of the Court held that 
political purposes and charitable purposes were not mutually exclusive and asserted that “[i]t is 
difficult to construct any adequate or principled theory to support blanket exclusion” in relation to 
political purpose or advocacy.3 As a result, the exclusion of political purpose in charity law is now 
unnecessary in New Zealand. The High Court case of Re Family First therefore provides the first 
consideration of this contemporary approach. In summary, Collins J allowed the appeal brought by 
Family First against the Charities Board of the Department of Internal Affairs – Charities Services 
(the Board), in which it was determined that Family First was no longer eligible to be registered 
as a charitable trust. In allowing the appeal, his Honour directed the Board to reconsider Family 
First’s application, in light of the Greenpeace judgment, and indeed, this judgment. In arriving at 
that conclusion, Collins J provided some useful consideration of charity law principles.
For a body to be registered as a charity in New Zealand, it must fall under one or more of the 
four principal categories of charitable purpose, or heads of charity, which are: the relief of poverty, 
the advancement of education, the advancement of religion, and any other matters beneficial to 
the community.4 The purposes must also be for public benefit. Where any one of the first three 
heads of charity is established, it is assumed, unless there is evidence to rebut that assumption, that 
the charity is for the public benefit. For the fourth category, the public benefit must be expressly 
established. A non-charitable activity will not negate charitability so long as that activity is ancillary 
to the overall charitable purpose.5
Before addressing those considerations, we should firstly contextualise the background to the 
Family First judgment. The Family First trust deed was created on 26 March 2006, and it set out 
its six purposes, including: promoting and advancing research and policy supporting marriage 
and family as foundational to a strong and enduring society, and to educate the public in their 
understanding of the institutional, legal and moral framework that makes a just and democratic 
society possible. In 2006, it was incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957, and approved 
as a charitable entity by the Charities Commission (as it was then known), and registered under the 
Charities Act 2005 in 2007.
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In 2008, the Charities Commission made inquiries as to the extent of Family First’s activities, 
including advocacy. As a result of these inquiries, the Charities Board (as it is now known) resolved 
to deregister Family First from the Charities Register in 2013. Family First filed a notice of appeal 
to the High Court shortly afterwards, and both parties agreed that Family First’s appeal should be 
deferred until after the Supreme Court gave its judgment in Greenpeace, which was delivered in 
August 2014.
Obviously, the Board did not utilise the Supreme Court judgment in making its decision to 
deregister Family First; rather it was heavily influenced by the earlier Court of Appeal judgment, 
whereby that Court considered that the level of advocacy conducted by Greenpeace was beyond 
the permitted, at the time, level of ancillary to its charitable purposes, thus referring it back to the 
Board for further consideration. Greenpeace appealed the approach of the Court of Appeal with 
regard to political activity, hence leading to the Supreme Court judgment.
Collins J noted that there were four grounds of appeal, and for the purposes of this case 
comment, we will concentrate on the first three. Firstly, that the Board erred when it concluded 
that Family First’s role and advocacy for its views in relation to the family is political and not a 
charitable purpose. This was addressed under the heading of “political purpose.” Secondly, that the 
Board erred in deciding that the organisation’s purposes do not include a purpose that is beneficial 
to the public under the fourth head of charity. This was addressed under the heading “benefit to 
the public.” Thirdly, that the Board erred in deciding that Family First’s purposes do not include 
the charitable purpose of advancing education. This was addressed under the heading “education 
purpose.” I will address each point in turn.
i. pOLiTicaL purpOSE
In relation to the deregistration of Family First, the Board had asserted that Family First had 
two purposes that were political. Firstly, with regard to its views about family life, the Board 
asserted that this purpose did not have self-evident public benefit; that it was political, and as a 
result, not charitable. Secondly, the entity had a purpose to procure government action that would 
be consistent with its own view. The Board asserted that this purpose was directed to procuring 
legislative change and government policies, which was political and not charitable.
Collins J noted however that the Board’s position that Family First’s political objects could 
not be charitable was not reconcilable with the Supreme Court’s approach taken in Greenpeace. 
This was because the Board’s decision was based on a legal proposition that has now been found 
to be incorrect. His Honour affirmed the Supreme Court’s determination that political purposes 
are not irreconcilable with political purposes. This therefore means that the appropriate course of 
action will be for the Board to reconsider the position of Family First in light of the Supreme Court 
judgment. 
The Board had also asserted that Family First’s advocacy role was “controversial”, and 
therefore self-evidently not of public benefit. The Supreme Court however stated that it was not a 
criterion for registration as a charitable entity that the advocacy undertaken, or views expressed, 
should be generally acceptable or non-contentious.6 As a result, Collins J stated that the Board 
should reconsider their approach with regard to controversial views, again in light of the Supreme 
Court determination. 
6 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2014] NZSC 105, [2015] 1 NZLR 169 at [75].
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ii. BENEfiT TO THE puBLic
Collins J stated that the Board should refer to analogous cases to determine public benefit. 
Nonetheless, his Honour did make a point of urging perhaps some restraint on this matter. The 
Board should be cautious not to match carefully the entity’s purposes with organisations that have 
successfully been recognised as charitable entities. This approach would risk undermining the 
view of the Supreme Court that political purposes should not be excluded from being classified as 
charitable.
Instead, his Honour noted that cases that could be of assistance to the Board in undertaking its 
analogical assessment would be entities that advocate for the mental and moral improvement of 
society. However, Collins J did state that the Board should not automatically accept that Family 
First’s purposes are charitable. The correct approach for the Board should be to assess whether 
Family First’s activities are aimed at promoting the moral improvement of society.  It is possible 
that some members of the Board may not personally approve of the views of Family First, but 
their subjective views should not be taken into consideration, and it may be possible to find a 
legitimate analogy between its role and other entities who have been found to be charitable. This 
methodology would be consistent with the obligations on the members of the Board to act with 
honesty, integrity and good faith.7
iii. EducaTiON purpOSE
The Board concluded that Family First advanced its polemical views on traditional forms 
of marriage under the guise of education, and therefore this was not genuine advancement of 
education. To be a charitable educational activity, the organisation must promote learning, and this 
may be achieved via a variety of means. For instance, training programmes, conferences, or by 
carrying out or disseminating research that improves knowledge around a particular issue.8
Collins J did note that a report Family First commissioned from the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research was a legitimate piece of research that contained significant research that had 
not been undertaken previously. This report was not referred to by the Board in its decision-making 
process. As a result, his Honour stated that when the Board re-examines Family First’s case, it 
will need to examine carefully this report, and determine if it is sufficient to qualify the entity’s 
activities as including the advancement of education for the public benefit.
This judgment has been useful for two key reasons. Firstly, it illustrates how the principles 
enunciated in the much anticipated Supreme Court case of Greenpeace may be applied practically, 
even in potentially contentious circumstances.  What this speaks to is the underpinning of 
fundamental charity law provisions, including the doctrine of public benefit, and the necessity for 
charity law to respond to contextual social frameworks. Charity law is therefore not constrained by 
historical approaches that may not be applicable, or relevant in a contemporary society, but at the 
same time, the High Court recognises the importance of ensuring that critical legal requirements 
of charity law are fulfilled.
Secondly, it demonstrates the importance of exercising objective assessment when considering 
appropriate and legitimate analogies between the role of Family First and organisations that have 
7 Charities Act, sch 2, cls 17 and 18.
8 Re Hopkins Will Trusts [1965] 1 Ch 669 at 680; Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565 (Ch) at 1576.
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advocated for similar improvements in society, as advocated by Family First. By undertaking 
such assessments, the decision that is reached is likely to demonstrate rational and legitimate 
considerations. This therefore has been a welcome decision in terms of demonstrating the evolution 
of charity law in a contemporary context.
